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CASE COMMENTS
PRIOR CONVICTION ON UNDERLYING PREDICATE OFFENSES
REQUIRED FOR CIVIL RICO SUIT
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 749 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit restricted the scope of "private civil RICO" ac-
tions under section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO)2 by adopting a prior criminal conviction
requirement.3
Sedima entered into a joint venture with Imrex to supply a NATO
subcontractor with aviation component parts.4 Imrex obtained the parts
and shipped them to Sedima for ultimate delivery to the subcontractor.
Sedima brought suit against Imrex, alleging that Imrex fraudulently in-
flated purchase prices and costs associated with the venture.'
The district court dismissed Sedima's RICO counts7 brought under
section 1964(c) because Sedima failed to allege an injury resulting from a
1. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. 9, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982)). Section 1964(c) provides as follows:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing section 1964(c));
infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing section 1962).
3. 741 F.2d at 496-504.
4, Id. at 484. Sedima is a Belgian corporation that imports and exports electronic and
mechanical parts. Id. Imrex is an American exporter of aircraft electronic component parts. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Sedima's complaint contained allegations of breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a constructive trust, conversion, and quasi contract. Id. In
addition, Sedima alleged that Imrex violated section 1962(c) of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
741 F.2d at 484; see infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing section 1962).
7. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 964-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Sedima alleged
that Imrex's use of the mails to send fraudulent purchase orders and credit memoranda constituted
an illegal "pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 965. The statutory definition of "racketeering
activity," 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982), includes acts that are indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)
(relating to mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) (relating to wire fraud). See infra note 8 (dis-
cussing "racketeering activity").
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"pattern of racketeering activity." 8 On appeal, the Second Circuit af-
firmed9 and held: As a precondition to a private cause of action under
section 1964(c), the defendant must first be convicted of the underlying
predicate offenses.X"
Congress enacted RICO in 1970 to halt the "infiltration of legitimate
businesses by organized crime."'" Section 1962 prohibits the use of pro-
ceeds from any "pattern of racketeering activity" in an "enterprise."' ' 2
In the event of a section 1962 violation, the government may resort to the
criminal penalties enumerated in section 196313 or the equitable remedies
8. 574 F. Supp. at 965. A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires the commission of at
least two acts of "racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). The statutory definition of
"racketeering activity" lists various federal and state offenses, which are commonly known as "pred-
icate acts." See id. § 1961(1). The district court held that Sedima failed to allege a "racketeering"
injury. 574 F. Supp. at 965; see infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (many courts require that a
civil RICO plaintiff demonstrate a "competitive" or "racketeering" injury as a prerequisite to a
§ 1964(c) action).
9. 741 F.2d at 504. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that only certain "racke-
teering" injuries are compensable under section 1964(c). Id. at 494. For a discussion of the "racke-
teering" injury requirement and other judicially imposed restrictions on civil RICO, see infra notes
21-35 and accompanying text.
10. 741 F.2d at 494-504.
11. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 & n.13 (1981); see also S. REP. No. 141, 82d
Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1951) (pre-RICO Senate Report stating that "[o]ne of the most perplexing
problems in the field of organized crime is presented by the fact that criminals and racketeers are
using the profits of organized crime to buy up and operate legitimate business enterprises); see gener-
ally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO). Basic Concepts-
Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-15 (1980) (discussing motivations leading
to the enactment of RICO).
Congress enacted RICO as Title 9 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)),
The preamble to OCCA states that Congress' purpose in enacting the statute was "to seek the eradi-
cation of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); see supra note 7 (defining "racketeering activity"); supra note 8
(defining "pattern of racketeering activity"). Specifically, section 1962(a) prohibits the investment of
"any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity. . . in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in.. .
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). Similarly, section 1962(b) prohibits the
acquisition of "any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in . . .interstate or
foreign commerce" through a "pattern of racketeering activity." Id. § 1962(b). Section 1962(c)
forbids the management of an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
Id. § 1962(c). A conspiracy to violate any of section 1962's proscriptions is unlawful under section
1962(d). Id. § 1962(d).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). The criminal sanctions for a RICO violation are imprison-
ment for up to twenty years, a fine of $25,000, and forfeiture of any interest in an unlawful enter-
prise. Id. § 1963(a); see generally Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 305-308 (1983)
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of section 1964.14 Section 1964(c) also allows a private cause of action
for persons "injured in [their] business or property" by a RICO viola-
tion 5 and awards victorious civil plaintiffs treble damages and attorney's
fees. 16
The broad scope of section 1964(c) has recently prompted an "explo-
(discussing RICO's criminal penalties); Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most
Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 391-92 (1980) (same).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). Section 1964(a) grants the district courts "jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962" and lists examples of equitable relief that courts may
grant to the government. Id. § 1964(a). In addition, section 1964(b) authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to pursue civil remedies, id. § 1964(b) and section 1964(d) estops a defendant convicted under
section 1963 from denying the essential allegations in a subsequent civil proceeding by the govern-
ment. Id. § 1964(d). For discussions of these government civil remedies, see Note, Equitable Law
Enforcement and the Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970, 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 508 (1976); Note,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity,"
124 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1975).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see supra note 2 (quoting § 1964(c)).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). The legislative history of section 1964(c) is unusual. Although
RICO largely originated in the Senate, section 1964(c) originated in the House of Representatives.
Congress derived the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 from S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969),
which did not contain a private civil cause of action. The legislative history is silent on why S. 30 did
not contain a private cause of action. Cf Blakey & Gettings, supra note 11, at 1017-18 (private civil
section dropped in effort to "streamline" otherwise complex bill). Section 1964(c) derives from H.R.
19586, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Consequently, the Senate Report never addressed section
1964(c). In addition, the House of Representatives did not discuss the potential legal issues associ-
ated with the private treble damage remedy. See Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int'l. Inc., 545 F. Supp.
1002, 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Although section 1964(a) vests authority in the district courts to grant equitable relief, section
1964(c) does not expressly grant such relief to private parties. Private parties arguably may seek
equitable relief either pursuant to a district court's general grant of authority under section 1964(a)
or pursuant to section 1964(c). See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 11, at 1038 n.133. The weight of
authority, however, opposes granting such relief to the private plaintiff. See, eg., Kaushal v. State
Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. IlI. 1983) (citing cases) (exhaustively analyzing legislative
history and concluding that private equitable relief is unavailable); see also Trane Co. v. O'Connor
Secs., 718 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (expressing "serious doubt" about the availability of private
equitable relief).
Congress anticipated that RICO's criminal and civil sanctions would "strik[e]. . . a mortal blow
against the property interests of organized crime." 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen.
Hruska); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591-93 (1981). Congress' purpose in
enacting RICO was thus contrary to the goals of the antitrust laws, which also sanction treble dam-
age awards. See, eg., Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1983), where the
court stated as follows:
The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition in the market place, . . . [The] use
of treble damage provisions in antitrust cases could threaten a company with economic
ruin ....
RICO has the opposite purpose. It is precisely designed to ruin those individuals and
enterprises it is aimed at. It is not designed to increase their efficiency or protect them
from insolvency.
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sion" of civil RICO litigation. 7 Plaintiffs have brought private civil
RICO actions to redress commercial injuries unrelated to organized
crime activity. 8 Widespread use of section 1964(c) has stigmatized non-
criminal defendants as "racketeers" 9 and has encouraged courts to limit
the scope of 1964(c) actions.2"
A minority of courts require that the plaintiff allege a "nexus" between
the defendant's activities and organized crime as a prerequisite to a civil
RICO action.2" Other courts require that the civil RICO plaintiff first
17. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
901 (1985).
18. Only three reported judicial opinions addressed private civil RICO claims by 1978 and only
fifteen by 1981. See, eg., Farmers Bank v. Bell Mfg. Co., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978) (rejecting
prior criminal conviction requirement); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(limiting § 1964(c) to cases where the defendant is linked to organized crime). Since 1981, however,
courts have reported nearly 200 private civil RICO cases, most having no connection with organized
crime. See, eg., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.) (insurance company's directors charged
with assuming additional liabilities to the detriment of policyholders), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508
(1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983) (allegations that defendant's
takeover strategy was a manipulative scheme violating section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Taylor v.
Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (investor sued broker for churning); Salisbury
v. Chapman, 527 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (allegation that realtors improperly failed to disclose
interest of mortgage in property); see also Siegel, "RICO" Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A.
Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
19. RICO's acknowledged purpose is to eradicate organized crime. See supra note 11. In addi-
tion, civil liability under RICO requires criminal conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518
F.2d 352, 365 n.36 (9th Cir. 1975) ("acts constituting racketeering activity must themselves be crimi-
nal offenses"); see also S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969) (racketeering activity is "an
act in itself subject to criminal sanction"). As a result, many civil RICO defendants feel stigmatized
by the racketeering connotations attaching to a RICO suit. See, e.g., Marcus, Racketeering Law
Increasingly Invoked to Thwart Takeovers, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 4 (suggesting that
plaintiffs utilized RICO as a "smear tactic" to intimidate defendants).
20. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text. Some commentators have proposed that
courts apply the criminal standard of proof in civil RICO actions as a limitation to section 1964(c)'s
scope. See Note, Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1055, 1063-65 (1975) (suggesting that a civil RICO
defendant "should arguably receive the benefit of a traditional criminal trial"); see also Strafer, Mas.
sumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
655, 715-18 (1982) (suggesting that appropriate standard of proof is "clear and convincing
evidence").
21. See, eg., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (RICO not
intended to reach ordinary businessmen); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,
527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). Recently in Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984), the court
dismissed the plaintiff's RICO claim because he failed to allege a connection between the defendant
and organized crime. The Aliberti court noted that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because it is not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979)); see also
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demonstrate a "competitive"22 or "racketeering"23 injury.
A few courts have suggested that criminal proceedings on the underly-
ing predicate offenses should precede a section 1964(c) action.2 4 Courts
adopting this third approach have looked to the statutory definition of
"racketeering activity"25 and have concluded that Congress intended to
American Say. Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Say. & Loan, 586 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Colo. 1984) (cautioning
against "slavish literalism" in construing civil RICO); cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (discussing the social purpose rule of statutory construction);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("even when the plain meaning
did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of
the legislation as a whole' this court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words") (quot-
ing Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
Most courts addressing the scope of section 1964(c) have rejected the "nexus" to organized crime
requirement. See Owl Construction Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272,
1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982). In Bennett v. Berg,
the Eighth Circuit held that RICO liability does not depend on a connection with organized crime.
The court argued that nothing in the plain language of RICO requires such a connection and that
the legislative history demonstrates a contrary congressional intention. Id. (citing 116 CONG. REc.
35,344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Pofi)). In Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir.
1984), Judge Posner concluded that "Congress deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more
concerned to avoid opening loopholes through which the minions of organized crime might crawl to
freedom than to avoid making garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble-damage proceed-
ings....". Id. at 654; see also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restrictions, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1101, 1107-09 (1982) (Congress risked imposing liability on defend-
ants unconnected to organized crime in order to cast a wider net).
22. See, e.g., Bankers Trust v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (re-
jecting "nexus" to organized crime but requiring competitive injury by reason of defendant's activi-
ties); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (RICO's
purpose is to prevent unfair competition). These decisions draw on the similarity between civil
RICO and antitrust remedies. See supra note 16. But cf. Note, supra note 21, at 1106 (rejecting
"competitive" injury requirement).
23. See, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int'l. Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal.
1982) ("plaintiff must allege not only injury from the predicate offenses, but injury of the type the
RICO statute was intended to prevent"); Landmark Savs. & Loan v. Rhodes, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-
09 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (section 1964(c) requires "something more" or different than injury from
predicate acts). These decisions reflect the influence of antitrust law. See supra note 16 (distinguish-
ing between civil RICO penalties and antitrust sanctions). In Brunswick Corp. v. Pubelo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the Supreme Court interpreted the Clayton Act's civil remedy provi-
sion, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1982), to require the type of injury that antitrust laws are intended to prevent.
429 U.S. at 489. These courts have adopted the analysis of Pueblo Bowl-C-Mat and have imposed a
similar standing requirement by predicating civil RICO liability on a "racketeering injury."
24. See Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bache Halsey Stuart
Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank, 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah 1983); Van Schaick v. Church of
Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982), which provides as follows:
[R]acketeering activity means (A) an act ...which is chargeable under state law and
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limit section 1964(c) actions to cases involving criminal proceedings. 6
Prior to Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,27 however, every circuit court of
appeals addressing the scope of private civil RICO had rejected this
prerequisite.28
In United States v. Cappetto,29 for example, the government brought a
1964(a) action to enjoin the defendants from conducting a gambling en-
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
[ . . (certain] provisions of title 18, United States Code. . . (C) any act which is indictable
under. . . [29 U.S.C. §§ 186, 501(c) (1982)]. . . or (D) any offense. . . punishable under
any law of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 7 (discussing "racketeering activity").
26. See Bache Halsey Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank, 558 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (D. Utah
1983). The Bache Halsey court concluded that the plaintiff's allegation there was that probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed the preditate act qualified as a "chargeable," .indicta-
ble," or "punishable" act and therefore satisfied the statutory requirement of "racketering activity."
Id. See also Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 682-683 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (predicate
acts must be based on prior conviction or pled with sufficient particularity to meet probable cause
standard).
Courts have frequently discussed the terms "chargeable," "indictable," and "punishable" in the
context of criminal RICO proceedings. In United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977),
the defendant argued that because the applicable state statute of limitations had run, the alleged
bribery acts were not "chargeable under state law" and thus outside the scope of section 1961(1).
The court rejected the defendant's contention, reasoning that Congress intended to permit indict-
ment for acts that were "chargeable under state law" at the time the acts were committed. Id. at
2234. The court reasoned that RICO's reference to state law violations merely identifies the conduct
prohibited and does not require application of state statutes of limitations or procedural rules, Id. at
1135; see also United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir. 1978) (following Forsythe);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1977) (prior acquittal insignificant when
original acts were "chargeable").
In Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd sub nom.,
Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983), a bank customer chal-
lenged the bank's practice of posting prime rates that were higher than the rates charged to commer-
cial customers. Id. at 1019. The court conceded that the customer's RICO claims satisfied the
literal meaning of RICO's provisions, but nevertheless dismissed her RICO counts. Id. at 1022. The
court reasoned that RICO is basically a criminal statute and that civil remedies merely provide an
"additional weapon" in RICO's "crime-fighting arsenal." Id. The court held, therefore, that the
criminal process should determine in the first instance whether posting inflated prime rates is crimi-
nal conduct. Id. The court noted that the availability of RICO's civil remedies may depend on an
indictment or a prior criminal conviction. Id.
27. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985); see infra notes 36-53 and
accompanying text.
28. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 19 n.15 (2d Cir. 1983) (dicta), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287
(7th Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.l (6th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); see
also In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 270-71 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
29. 502 F.2a 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
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terprise, even though criminal proceedings had never been brought
against the defendants.3" The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's
contention that civil RICO liability is contingent upon a criminal convic-
tion of the defendant and affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive
relief.31  Similarly, in USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,3 the
Sixth Circuit rejected a prior criminal conviction requirement for section
1964(c) actions. The court observed that section 1964(c) requires only "a
violation of section 1962."11 The court reasoned that Congress would
have referred to section 1963, which imposes criminal sanctions, 34 rather
than section 1962 if it had intended to impose a prior criminal conviction
30. Id. at 1354-55; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing equitable remedies of
section 1964). Cappetto did not address a section 1964(c) private cause of action. The defendants,
however, argued that all of section 1964 was unconstitutionally vague, and the court accordingly
addressed all forms of civil RICO actions.
31. 502 F.2d at 1357. The court in Cappetto relied on In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), and
concluded that a civil proceeding is not "essentially criminal" just because the alleged acts also are
punishable as crimes. 502 F.2d at 1356. The Seventh Circuit explained that Congress provided the
government with civil remedies to relieve it of the higher standard of proof in criminal actions and to
facilitate its efforts in combatting organized crime. Id. at 1357; cf. Note, supra note 20, at 1063-65
(suggesting a due process balancing of the government's interest in obtaining information against the
defendant's interests in freedom from stigmatization and economic harassment).
Other courts have followed Cappetto in rejecting a prior criminal conviction requirement in pri-
vate civil RICO actions. See, eg., Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391,
396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int'l Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 n.8 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarthy, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-314 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers
Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978) (RICO does not
condition a private cause of action in any way upon a previous criminal RICO conviction).
32. 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 95 n. 1; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing section 1962). At least
one court has expressly rejected the contention that a section 1964(c) "violation" means "convic-
tion" and therefore requires a prior criminal conviction of the defendant. Kaushal v. State Bank of
India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The court in Kaushal stated that a "'violation' of Section
1962 by a Private RICO defendant must be understood in a civil context: Allegations of the Private
RICO complaint need show only a prima facie violation of Section 1962." Id. at 579 n.9.
Recently, in United States v. MacLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit held that
the government cannot prosecute an employee under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
without a prior conviction of the employer. Id. at 660. The FCPA provides sanctions for an em-
ployee convicted under the FCPA only if the employer is "found to have violated" section 32 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 781f(c)(3) (1982) (emphasis added)). The
government argued that it may satisfy the "found to have violated" requirement by establishing in
the employee's trial that the employer violated the Act. 738 F.2d at 657. The court rejected this
argument and held that "violated" means "convicted" as used in section 78ff(c)(3). Id. at 659.
Focusing on the purposes on the FCPA, the court reasoned that this construction is necessary to
prevent the employer from using the employee as a scapegoat to escape conviction. Id.
34. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the criminal sanctions of section
1963).
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requirement.35
The Second Circuit first addressed the prior criminal proceedings limi-
tation in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 36  Diverging from decisions of
other circuits,37 the court held that a defendant is subject to civil RICO
liability under section 1964(c) only if he has been convicted of the under-
lying predicate acts.38
Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, first noted the paucity of analy-
sis by courts rejecting a prior criminal conviction requirement. 39 Turn-
ing to the statutory language of RICO, Judge Oakes observed that
Congress modeled section 1964(c) after the civil remedy provision of the
Clayton Act' and noted that the Clayton Act provides compensation for
any injury caused "by reason of anything forbidden by the antitrust
laws."41 Section 1964(c) provides compensation for injuries caused "by
reason of a violation of [RICO]." 42 Judge Oakes found the variation sig-
nificant, concluding that a RICO "violation" means a conviction.43
35. 689 F.2d at 95 n.1.
36. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S, Ct. 901 (1985). The Second Circuit
explicitly left the prior criminal conviction issue "to another day" in Trane Co. v. O'Connor Secs.,
718 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983).
37. See cases cited supra note 28. The Second Circuit addressed the "explosion" of civil RICO
litigation as follows:
Given the general purpose of the RICO legislation, the uses to which private civil RICO
has been put have been extraordinary, if not outrageous. Section 1964(c) has not proved
particularly useful for generating treble damage actions against mobsters by victimized
businesspeople. It has, instead, led to claims against such respected and legitimate "enter-
prises" as the American Express Company, E.F. Hutton & Co., Lloyd's of London, Bear
Stearns & Co., and Merrill Lynch, to name a few defendants labeled as "racketeers" in civil
RICO claims ....
741 F.2d at 487.
38. 741 F.2d at 502-03. Circuit Judge Oakes wrote the majority opinion in which Circuit Judge
Lumbard joined. Circuit Judge Cardamone filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 504. Sedima was the
first of three decisions handed down in succession by the Second Circuit. The second decision,
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), held that a claim under section 1964(c)
must allege a distinct "racketeering injury." Id. at 516; see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text
(discussing "racketeering activity"). In the third decision, Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1984), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a private civil RICO action on the
basis of Sedima and Bankers Trust. Id. at 533. The opinion in Furman, however, strongly criticized
the reasoning in both of these cases.
39. 741 F.2d at 496-97.
40. Id. at 498. The Clayton Act provides in part: "[A]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15
U.S.C. -§ 15(a) (1982); see also supra note 2 (quoting section 1964(c)).
41. 741 F.2d at 498 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)) (emphasis added).
42. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added)); see supra note 2.
43. 741 F.2d at 498-99; see also supra note 33.
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Judge Oakes also looked to the statutory definition of "racketeering
activity," which includes acts that are "chargeable" or "indictable" and
"offense[s]" that are "punishable."'  Judge Oakes reasoned that Con-
gress assumed that civil proceedings would always follow criminal pro-
ceedings.45 A punishable "offense," he noted, refers to criminal
conviction.46 Judge Oakes observed that the terms "indictable" and
"chargeable" arguably refer to conduct that is not necessarily "crimi-
nal."47 He concluded, however, that "indictable" conduct requires the
return of an indictment and that "chargeable" conduct requires the re-
turn of an information.48
In addition, Judge Oakes asserted that absent a prior criminal convic-
tion of the predicate acts, section 1964(c) would permit recovery for
"criminal conduct" proved only by a preponderance of the evidence.4 9
Judge Oakes examined RICO's legislative history and concluded that
Congress did not intend to lower the criminal burden of proof." He
contended that if Congress had considered this apparent anomaly, it
would have explicitly required a prior criminal conviction.51
In dissent, Judge Cardamone criticized the majority for launching
RICO into a "sea of uncertainty."5 2 Judge Cardamone contended that
the majority's decision will deprive victims of a remedy whenever a rack-
eteer escapes conviction through plea bargaining or the government de-
cides not to prosecute. 3
Sedima represents a severe, but prudent restriction on the scope of
private civil RICO. Congress' failure to draft a private civil remedy con-
sistent with RICO's purposes5 4 and to respond to the resulting "explo-
sion" of private RICO claims has created confusion in the courts and
44. Id. at 499; see also note 25 (quoting "racketeering activity" definition).
45. 741 F.2d at 499-500.
46. Id. at 499.
47. Id. at 499-500.
48. Id. at 500; see also note 26 (discussing judicial interpretation of the words "chargeable,"
"indictable," and "punishable").
49. 741 F.2d at 501-02; see supra note 31 (discussing burden of proof in civil RICO actions).
50. 741 F.2d at 502. "Absent such explicit congressional direction, such a narrow reading of
section 1964(c) best integrates that subsection into the entire structure of the Act. On the other
hand, if the broad reading is accepted, problems are created of which there is no indication that
Congress even dreamed." Id. at 501. Judge Oakes found only "clanging silence" from his exaniina-
tion of section 1964(c)'s legislative history. Id. at 492.
51. Id. at 502.
52. Id. at 504 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating Congress' purposes in enacting RICO).
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outrage among the new community of "racketeers.""5 Sedima's prior
criminal conviction requirement will protect legitimate businessmen
from civil RICO liability and will subject only those persons whose activ-
ities merit criminal prosecution to treble damages.
Although Sedima is correct in spirit,56 the court's interpretation of the
statutory language is flawed. Courts have consistently held that section
1961(1)'s reference to "indictable," "chargeable," and "punishable" acts
merely describes the type of conduct that constitutes racketeering activ-
ity.57 The Sedima court's conclusion that this language connotes a crimi-
nal conviction prerequisite appears unprecedented.
Judge Oakes' contention that section 1964(c)'s reference to a "viola-
tion" means a conviction on the underlying predicate acts 8 reflects com-
mon sense and furthers the purposes of RICO. The court, however,
should have limited civil RICO liability to violations of RICO itself. Sec-
tions 1963 and 1964(c) both predicate liability on a "violation of section
1962." The references to the substantive offenses of section 1962, rather
than the underlying offenses, suggest that a prior criminal conviction of
the defendant for a violation of section 1962 is a precondition to a private
civil RICO action.59
Sedima's prior criminal conviction requirement will drastically reduce
the amount of civil RICO litigation in the Second Circuit. In addition,
the decision should force either the Supreme Court or Congress to take
notice of the uncertainty among courts faced with increasing numbers of
civil RICO claims.' Sedima is consistent with Congress' goals in enact-
55. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
56. Sedima is an excellent case for the application of the social purpose rule of statutory con-
struction. See supra note 21 (discussing social purpose rule). The clear ambiguity presented by
RICO's purpose and RICO's use should suggest to courts that section 1964(c) is poorly drafted and
poorly integrated with the rest of RICO. Several courts have recently adopted narrow constructions
of RICO based on its purpose, rather than its language. See cases cited supra note 21.
57. See cases cited supra note 26. Thus, an act may be "chargeable under state law" even
though the state statute of limitations has run. See United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134
(3d Cir. 1977).
58. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
59. Judge Oakes contended that if Congress had intended to base civil liability on a violation of
RICO, it would have referred to section 1963, RICO's criminal provisions, rather than section 1962.
741 F.2d at 497-98. Section 1963, however, contains no substantive prohibitions. Had Congress
referred to section 1963 in section 1964(c), the reference would have been meaningless.
60. The Supreme Court may remove the confusion surrounding section 1964(c) and the prior
criminal conviction requirement this term. The Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari in
Sedima and its companion case, American Nat'l Bank v. Haroco, Inc., - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1984),
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ing RICO because it reads back into RICO the criminal element.
P.LR.
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985) (No. 84-822). Only Sedima, however, raises the
prior criminal conviction issue.
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